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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC marks a resounding
victory for the principle of church self-governance and the autonomy of
religious institutions. But it is just the beginning of the story, not the end.
Hosanna-Tabor properly recognizes that a significant measure of church
autonomy is a key element part of the American church–state settlement,
and may signal a broader recognition of the important role played by
nonstate institutions in our social infrastructure. But it does not tell us how
churches should behave under such a regime of autonomy, or how those
inside and outside the church should respond. This commentary argues that
these are the questions we are now obliged to consider. Institutional
autonomy imposes responsibilities as well as rights, and churches must
ponder when, whether, and how they will use their autonomy. It also
imposes a civic duty on citizens to monitor, engage with, and sometimes
criticize our central infrastructural nonstate institutions. In short, HosannaTabor raises nonlegal questions that are just as important as the allocation
of legal authority between churches and other nonstate institutions and the
state.
AUTHOR—Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of
Law. I am grateful to the participants and commentators at the session on
Hosanna-Tabor held at the second Annual Law and Religion Roundtable at
Northwestern University School of Law in summer 2011.
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INTRODUCTION
Law is filled with stories without endings. Case reports and law review
articles generally conclude with the judgment on a case. Once judgment is
rendered, either by a judge or by a scholar analyzing an opinion, it is
relatively rare for anyone to consider what happens next.1 In drama, a gun
that appears onstage in Act I is sure to go off in Act III: the play has not
ended until there is a climax, until the full narrative has reached its
conclusion.2 In law, the curtain often draws shut abruptly in medias res, at
the end of Act II.
One obvious reason for this is that the law and its students generally
focus on a single question: the question of legal power, especially the power
of courts to order some action and make it stick.3 Authority, jurisdiction,
liability, or immunity; terms like these are the meat and drink of the law.
They are the answers to the question of who gets to “say what the law is.”4
It is all perfectly natural, and perfectly odd. Consider some famous
cases that turn on the question of the nature and limits of judicial power. It
is natural to want to know, in a case in which a police department has been
using a potentially lethal “chokehold” method of restraint, whether the
department can be made to cease its conduct.5 If the government is accused
of bombing a country with which it is not at war, you naturally want to
know whether it can be ordered to ground its planes.6 If a private company
is collaborating with the state to engage in the extraordinary rendition of
individuals to nations that commit torture, you will want to know whether it
can be held to account or whether any litigation should be dismissed
because it would require the revelation of sensitive confidential
information.7
1
As always, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional
Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998).
2
See ACADEMIC DICTIONARY OF FICTION 40 (Ashish Pandey ed., 2005) (defining Anton
“Chekhov’s gun”).
3
See, e.g., Christoph Menke, Law and Violence, 22 LAW & LIT. 1, 11 (2010) (“Law is about power,
its own power.”). The canonical discussion is in Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word,
95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
4
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
6
See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
7
See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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Unless your focus is narrow and your curiosity highly limited,
however, you will also want to know what happens next. Unless you
confuse the “is” of judicial or governmental power with a moral “ought,”
you are unlikely to think that the fact that a party, public or private, can do
something without legal consequences means that it should. Some party
will be left with the final authority to act; but how it acts matters as much or
more than the fact that it can act. To say that a dispute is out of the court’s
hands does not mean it is in no one’s hands at all. The party with the
authority will still have a choice about what to do with that authority. And
when, in one of these judicial dramas, the court’s obligations end, our
obligations as citizens are just beginning. We must decide whether society
should bow out of the tale, leaving the party with the authority to act as it
wishes—or whether, even if the law cannot act, society should take soft or
hard action to persuade the party to act as we think it should. Legal power is
not always the last word.
So it is with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.8 In Hosanna-Tabor, the
Supreme Court affirmed what the circuit courts had long held9: that the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect religious organizations
from employment discrimination claims brought by employees acting in a
“ministerial” position.10 Although the case was hotly contested before the
Supreme Court and among scholars, the result came as little surprise. What
was more striking was the Court’s unanimity and forcefulness. HosannaTabor sends a powerful message about the “special solicitude” accorded by
the First Amendment to “the rights of religious organizations,” not just
individuals.11 For students of the First Amendment and champions of
religious freedom, it is a decision of profound importance.

8

132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006); Combs v.
Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350–51 (5th Cir. 1999);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972). As one court has put it, the basic rule suggests that one or both of the
Religion Clauses “deprive[] a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a Title VII employment discrimination
suit brought against a church by a member of its clergy, even when the church’s challenged actions are
not based on religious doctrine.” Combs, 173 F.3d at 345.
10
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”).
11
Id. at 706. The Court’s emphasis on the rights of religious organizations is, I confess, of
particular interest to me. In a forthcoming book, I argue for the importance of particular institutions,
including religious entities, as key parts of our social infrastructure, and argue that courts ought to grant
them considerable autonomy under the First Amendment to shape their own ends. See PAUL HORWITZ,
FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming 2012); see also Paul Horwitz, Churches as First
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) (making
this argument with specific respect to churches).
9

975

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

If Hosanna-Tabor settled the basic question of whether the ministerial
exception exists, however, it hardly ended the discussion—nor could it. The
debate leading up to the Court’s decision was mostly focused on Act II
questions: questions of power, jurisdiction, and immunity. As is often the
case with such discussions, these debates tended to treat the answers to
those questions as dispositive of the broader normative questions of
whether and when churches ought to exercise their immunity, or at best to
leave those questions to one side. To do so was arguably not enough then
and is certainly insufficient now.
In this Essay, I argue that we would be wrong to treat our discussion of
the ministerial exception as ending at Act II, with the decision in HosannaTabor. Rather, in thinking about the ministerial exception, we—especially
those of us who have championed it12—have a scholarly and moral
obligation to think about what happens in the next Act. We need to do so
from a perspective that acknowledges the dangers as well as the value of
church autonomy.13 This perspective treats churches as beneficial but
imperfect institutions, not saintly ones, and asks what sorts of nonlegal
levers—from internal debate within the church to external public
criticism—might encourage churches to exercise their authority sensitively
and appropriately. Conversely, opponents of the ministerial exception
doctrine should cease caricaturing churches as self-interested actors whose
only apparent goal is to escape legal liability for egregious employment
practices—to remain “above the law.”14 These critics should think instead
about both the deeper meanings of the ministerial exception and the role
that nonlegal mechanisms can play in encouraging fairness in its exercise.
I begin by offering a brief defense of the ministerial exception
doctrine, emphasizing more firmly than the Court itself did the view that it

12

See HORWITZ, supra note 11; Horwitz, supra note 11.
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH
L. REV. 47, 51–52 (discussing the “[d]ark [s]ide of [g]roups and [g]roup [r]ights,” including “the threat
that groups pose to individual identity, autonomy, and freedom”); William P. Marshall, The Other Side
of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 863 (1993) (“Religion is one of the most important forces in society.
It provides immeasurable benefits to both humanity and the individual. But religion cannot be greeted in
the public square solely with celebration; it must also be greeted with caution.”). For the argument that
religion’s “dark side” does not adequately distinguish it from other social forces, institutions, and ideas,
see STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS
19, 21 (2000). For more on the benefits—and costs—of a more vigorous approach to institutional
autonomy in First Amendment law, see generally HORWITZ, supra note 11.
14
Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from
Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); see also Leslie C. Griffin, Ordained
Discrimination: The Cases Against the Ministerial Exception 1 (Univ. of Houston Pub. Law & Legal
Theory
Series
2011-A-9,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1936073 (“[T]he numerous justifications for the [ministerial] exception are all a restatement
of one foundational argument: that religious groups are entitled to disobey the law.”).
13
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reflects a fundamental division of authority between church and state.15 I
then discuss the role of both internal religious discussion and external
public criticism as a tool for policing the use of the ministerial exception. I
argue that thinking about Act III is necessary not only to properly evaluate
the law in this area, but also because scholars and citizens have a moral
obligation to think about what autonomous institutions like churches ought
to do, not just about how the law allocates authority in this area.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS POWER
The basic defense of the ministerial exception starts with history and
first principles. The historical argument is ultimately a recapitulation of
Western legal and political history itself. As Michael McConnell puts it:
[F]rom at least the time of Pope Gelasius [in the fifth century A.D.], standard
legal thinking in Western Europe was based on the theory of Two Kingdoms—
the idea that God created two different forms of authority, two swords that
were clearly distinguished: spiritual and temporal, sacred and secular, church
and state. These spheres were undeniably separate, and not because the state
chose to make them so.16

That general distinction endured even after the schism in Western
Christianity caused by the Reformation: Lutheran thought, for instance,
replaced the concept of “two swords” with one of “two kingdoms.”17
Despite their differences, a common theme ran through these formulations:
“the spiritual and temporal powers” must “remain separate in function,” and
at a minimum the temporal authority “had no power to . . . mete out
religious discipline.”18
The American tradition of separation is basically continuous with this
history. As one of the amici in the Hosanna-Tabor case observed, “Th[e]
15

This line of argument is more prominent in the concurring opinion filed by Justice Alito, joined
by Justice Kagan. That opinion, rather than referring simply to a ministerial “exception” from the law,
emphasizes the “crucial autonomy” of religious entities and states that “the Religion Clauses protect a
private sphere within which religious bodies are free to govern themselves in accordance with their own
beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Carl H.
Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the
First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 168, 169 (2012) (“[T]he decision in Hosanna-Tabor is not about an
ordinary constitutional right—subject to balancing—but about a structural limit on the scope of the
government’s authority.”).
16
Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 7, 8 (footnote omitted). For
similar sentiments, see, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious
Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review); John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of
Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003) (book review).
17
See, e.g., William B. Ewald, The Protestant Revolutions and Western Law, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
181, 188 (2005) (internal quotations marks omitted) (reviewing HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (2003)).
18
Witte, supra note 16, at 1878–79.
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differentiation between the institutions of church and state has become a
part of the American constitutional tradition.”19 Indeed, the tradition
predates the Constitution itself. It can be found in the writings of Roger
Williams,20 the structure of the Puritan communities in New England, and
elsewhere.21 The preamble to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts Bay
in 1648, for example, proclaimed: “[O]ur churches and civil state have been
planted, and grown up (like two twins)”; to conflate the two would lead to
the “misery (if not ruin) of both.”22 Closer to the Revolutionary Era, it was
apparent in the thinking of John Adams, who admired the vision of separate
spheres championed by the Puritans and made sure that the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 guaranteed the right of churches to select their own
ministers without state interference.23 And it was evident in the “strikingly
jurisdictional” language that James Madison employed in his influential
Memorial and Remonstrance: “[I]n matters of Religion, no man’s right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and . . . Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.”24 In the post-revolutionary period, “[t]he key
to resolving” church–state disputes “was to define a private sphere,
protected against interference by the vested rights doctrine and the
separation of church and state.”25 The American tradition, in short, has long
embraced “a constitutional order in which the institutions of religion . . . are
distinct from, other than, and meaningfully independent of, the institutions
of government.”26

19

Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 2470847, at *6 [hereinafter Volokh Brief].
20
See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 289, 290–91 (2005).
21
See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 100–04. For other examples, see Volokh Brief, supra note 19, at
12–18.
22
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY A2 (1648) (Max Farrand ed., 1929).
23
See JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 309–11 (2007); see also Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays
God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005,
2016 (2007) (quoting the relevant passage of the Massachusetts Constitution).
24
Smith, supra note 16, at 1880 (alterations and omission in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785),
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE 59, 60 (J.F. Maclear ed., 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As Chief Justice Roberts noted for the Court in Hosanna-Tabor, this was not
the only occasion on which Madison spoke in more or less jurisdictional terms. The Chief Justice cited,
inter alia, James Madison’s statement vetoing an act of Congress incorporating the Protestant Episcopal
Church in Alexandria, because it “exceeds the rightful authority to which Governments are limited, by
the essential distinction between civil and religious functions . . . .” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703–
04 (quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982–83 (1811)).
25
Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on
Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7, 42 (2001).
26
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?,
22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 523 (2007).
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Some central constitutional principles rest on this historical foundation.
The most important is the oft-repeated notion that religious institutions in
this nation must have the “power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.”27 Similarly, the state may not interfere with a church’s selection
or rejection of its religious members, let alone its leaders.28
A third principle, regularly derived both from this history and from
broader views about the limits of the judicial role in church–state disputes,
is that judges cannot evaluate the kinds of religious questions that come up
in employment discrimination cases involving ministerial employees,
among other places. This position is sometimes called the “hands off”
rule.29
One standard justification for the hands-off treatment of religious
questions by courts is that judges are simply incompetent to address them.
For strategic reasons, opponents of the ministerial exception in the period
leading up to Hosanna-Tabor routinely focused on the question of judicial
incompetence. It allowed them to argue that many ministerial exception
cases raise issues that judges are competent to decide,30 thus narrowing the
potential scope of the exception. At the same time, it allowed them to argue
that courts engaged in a case-by-case analysis of such disputes end up
entangled in even more theological questions, thus making it preferable to
do away with the ministerial exception altogether.31 In the result, the
Hosanna-Tabor Court, while leaving open the possibility that courts can
decide many disputes involving churches,32 concluded that the ministerial
27

Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
See, e.g., id. at 119 (observing that free exercise of religion entails freedom of “an ecclesiastical
right, the Church’s choice of its hierarchy”); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280
U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“[I]t is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.”); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139–40 (1872) (recognizing that courts “cannot decide who ought to be members of
the church”); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The relationship
between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. . . . Matters touching this relationship
must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”); id. at 559 (noting that “matters of
church government and administration” lie “beyond the purview of civil authorities”); see also
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasizing “a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments”).
29
See generally Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
“hands-off approach”).
30
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Religion Professors in Support of Respondents at 26,
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532698, at *26 (“Hosanna-Tabor incorrectly
assumes that adjudicating ministers’ antidiscrimination claims will require courts to decide questions
beyond their institutional competence. A court may decide [a plaintiff’s] retaliation claim without ever
becoming entangled in doctrinal or theological questions.”) [hereinafter Professors’ Brief].
31
See id. at 32–35.
32
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today
28
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exception’s categorical nature precludes case-by-case consideration of the
competence of courts to evaluate particular disputes.33
In sum, the conventional justifications for the ministerial exception
consist of a set of simple principles with a long historical pedigree. Courts
cannot decide religious disputes. They may not resolve questions of church
doctrine or governance. And they may not interfere in a church’s decision
about who constitutes an acceptable leader or member. These principles are
all confirmed by the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor.
These principles focus first on the fundamentals of religious freedom—
those rights without which basic religious freedom could not be said to
exist—and second on the incapacities of courts. For many supporters of the
ministerial exception, however, they are still just surface matters,
conclusions that follow from deeper premises. They lead us back to the
central question that occupies the law, at least up through Act II: the
question of power.
Here, some of us see a fundamental and perhaps more radical principle
underlying not only the ministerial exception but the law of religious
freedom generally: courts, and the state itself, are simply not authorized to
intervene in life at the heart of the church. At a deep level, these questions
lie beyond the reach of the state altogether. The two kingdoms of temporal
and spiritual authority, of church and state, constitute two separate
sovereigns. The state can no more intervene in the sovereign affairs of the
church than it can in the sovereign affairs of Mexico or Canada. This
allocation of authority is not intended to signal the primacy of the church or
the inferiority of the state; it is a settlement between coequal institutions,
one that says that “[government] is not the sole possessor of sovereignty”
and that the church “exercise[s] within the area of [its] competence an
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority” all its
own.34 Whatever the church’s “area of competence” may be, it extends at
least to fundamental questions of church structure and leadership, and it
we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the
exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or
tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of
the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”); see also id. (noting Hosanna-Tabor’s
argument that “the ministerial exception would not in any way bar criminal prosecutions for interfering
with law enforcement investigations or other proceedings”).
33
See id. at 709 (“The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to
select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s
alone.” (citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952))); see
also id. at 715–16 (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting the government’s argument that courts should be able
to evaluate whether a church’s dismissal of a ministerial employee was for religious reasons or whether
religion served as a mere pretext for discrimination, because such inquiries would lead inevitably to
judicial “judgment[s] about church doctrine”).
34
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV.
91, 91 (1953).
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precludes state control over ministerial employment decisions like those in
Hosanna-Tabor.
As radical as this description may seem, it lies at the heart of the
Western church–state settlement instantiated by the First Amendment.35 It is
reflected in the many decisions in which courts have said that the
ministerial exception is not merely an affirmative defense, but a
jurisdictional matter.36 Although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor rejected that
argument as a technical doctrinal matter,37 its holding and language are
broadly consistent with the view that “[t]he role of the contemporary state is
broad indeed, but it remains circumscribed by its penultimacy. Life’s
ultimate questions are to be left in private hands, and when those hands are
institutional, the state must respect the internal life and self-governance of
such institutions.”38
This authority-based argument for the ministerial exception is not
novel. But it is radical, or at least it may seem so to those who have grown
accustomed to thinking that the state is the ultimate arbiter. Its opponents,
both before and after Hosanna-Tabor, have room to argue that it runs
contrary to the statist orientation of modern law exemplified by the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, which said that

35

See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with
the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”).
36
See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); Tomic v.
Catholic Diocese, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil
Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (exploring the
jurisdictional aspects of the ministerial exception). For a broader historical argument to this effect, see
Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent & Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American
Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385. See also Volokh Brief, supra note 19, at 4 (“The civil authority
lacks ‘competence’ to intervene in such matters, not so much because they lie beyond its technical or
intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdictional power.”).
37
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (“We conclude that the exception operates as an
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”).
38
Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002); see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“When a minister
who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First
Amendment has struck the balance for us.”); Esbeck, supra note 15, at 169 (arguing that Hosanna-Tabor
represents “a structural limit on the scope of the government’s authority” with respect to internal
questions of church governance, and concluding that “the First Amendment, understood within the
historical setting that gave rise to its adoption, has determined that there are a few areas of authority that
have not been rendered unto Caesar”); Kalscheur, supra note 36, at 93. For more on the jurisdictional
issues surrounding the ministerial exception, see Howard M. Wasserman, Essay, Prescriptive
Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
287, 316 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/02-2012/Wasserman.pdf (arguing that the Court’s
jurisdictional ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was correct, but insisting that the Court’s decision that “church
personnel and organizational decisions [lie] beyond congressional regulation” represents a significant
recognition of “[t]he church’s status as a special competing and predominant sovereign”).

981

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the Free Exercise Clause could not stand in the way of any neutral and
generally applicable law that only incidentally burdens religion.39
But even the relatively statist modern Court has recognized that there
are realms the law is not free to enter.40 If the greatest weakness of the
proponents of the ministerial exception has been the sweeping nature of
their claims, its opponents’ greatest weakness is that they ignore the fact
that the Court has never pushed too hard on the rule of general applicability
and other imperial claims on the part of the state. It has always pulled back,
recognizing limits to the state’s reach where central internal religious
practices are involved. As Hosanna-Tabor confirms, even after Smith, core
areas of church doctrine and governance remain untouched by the state.
In short, as Hosanna-Tabor makes clear, the ministerial exception is
not some incidental, ad hoc creation. It is a fundamental part of the structure
of American religious freedom. It represents a recognition of the basic idea
that the First Amendment, the Constitution, and Western constitutionalism
more generally guarantee a “free church in a free state.”41 It ensures, at a
minimum, that churches must have a free hand in selecting those who

39

494 U.S. 872 (1990). Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith because it “involved government
regulation of only outward physical acts,” while the instant case “concern[ed] government interference
with an internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith and mission of the church itself.” HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. Although I think the Court was correct in distinguishing Smith, see, e.g.,
Horwitz, supra note 11, at 117–18, its language was not terribly satisfying. See also Esbeck, supra note
15, at 172 n.20 (acknowledging that “the Court’s distinction of Smith and Hosanna-Tabor is
contestable”). Esbeck argues that it does nonetheless “make practical sense to distinguish [church]
governance from [religious] sacraments” because sacraments such as the ingestion of peyote or the use
of snakes during prayer services may impose harms on others and thus require legal balancing, while
internal governance affairs do not. Id. Again, however, that argument is not entirely satisfying; it does
not tell us when different kinds of harms to individuals should be seen as involving internal or external
acts, or why questions concerning sacraments should be treated as involving external matters while
questions concerning an employment relationship between a minister and a church are treated as
involving wholly internal matters. Suffice it to say for now that although I think the Court was right to
draw a line between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor, it has not yet drawn a line clear enough to resolve such
questions—and any efforts to do so may ultimately raise harder questions about Smith than the Court is
prepared to admit as yet.
40
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (noting that the Court’s opinion in Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), “radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine” (omission in
original) (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41
ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 85 (2008).
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perform basic religious functions.42 One need not accept the widest possible
account of church autonomy in order to agree on that much. 43
The Court did not say or do everything it might have done to
underscore this point. Even though it rightly rejected the government’s
argument that churches’ rights could be adequately protected through
freedom of association rather than as a matter of the Religion Clauses,44 the
concurrence, which was strongly protective of the institutional autonomy of
churches, still drew too heavily on expressive association jurisprudence in
describing churches as “associations formed for expressive purposes” such
as “the collective expression and propagation of shared religious ideals.”45 It
did not give sufficient weight to the nonexpressive value of associations
such as churches, which are not simply conduits for speech, but
fundamental sites for the formation of identity and crucial bulwarks against
the state.46 Nor did the Court say enough about the degree of deference
owed to churches in determining whether some question falls within its
right of institutional self-governance.47 Still, it did a great deal. Its broad
statement that the First Amendment “gives special solicitude to the rights of
religious organizations”48 cannot be taken lightly. In sum, as a matter of
law, history, and deeper constitutional meaning, the Hosanna-Tabor Court
gave religious entities a signal victory in affirming the ministerial
exception.

42
See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 10, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3919718 (“[Hosanna-Tabor] is about
institutional separation—the least controversial core of separation of church and state.”) [hereinafter
Reply Brief]; id. (“The government cannot control the internal affairs of churches any more than
churches can control the institutions of government.”).
43
See, e.g., Volokh Brief, supra note 19, at 32 (conceding that not everyone counts as a “minister”
for purposes of the ministerial exception).
44
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
45
Id. at 712–13 (Alito, J., concurring).
46
For criticisms of expressive association doctrine on the ground that it gives insufficient
recognition to the communal and identity-forming importance of churches and other associations, see,
e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1675–76; Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the
Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 958–60 (2004).
47
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula
for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”). The concurring opinions are much stronger on
this point. See id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that, in my view, the
Religion Clauses require civil courts to . . . defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding
of who qualifies as its minister.”); id. at 716 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing for a functional approach to
the determination of who qualifies as a minister, and adding, “What matters in the present case is that
Hosanna-Tabor believes that the religious function that respondent performed made it essential that she
abide by the [church’s] doctrine of internal dispute resolution; and the civil courts are in no position to
second-guess that assessment.”).
48
Id. at 706.
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II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS RESPONSIBILITY
At first glance, the question whether the ministerial exception exists
may seem to be the only, or at least the most important, question raised by
Hosanna-Tabor. It is neither. Just as we ought to care whether the United
States actually bombs Cambodia and not just that the Court says it will not
interfere with such a decision, we likewise ought to care what churches
actually do with the ministerial exception, not just that it exists. We ought
to care, in other words, not just whether churches possess a particular
power, but what they do with it. With Hosanna-Tabor decided, it is well
past time to ask that question. What should churches do with their victory?
And should citizens consider their own role in the conversation to be over?
Surely the church’s deliberations as to when to invoke the exception
and how to treat complaints will not end now that the ministerial exception
is firmly in place. While the courts must defer to the church’s decision,
deference does not tell us what the church should do in the context of
particular disputes.49
The answer to that question will vary, just as churches vary. Even if the
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor mostly takes the law out of the mix, a
church facing an employment dispute will still have a number of options,
and its choices will still vary, depending on a mix of factors. A church that
opposed gender or racial discrimination, for example, might still want to
provide ministers who complain of discrimination with an internal dispute
resolution process and a set of remedies equivalent to those provided by the
law. It might conclude that nothing less would satisfy its own religious
belief that discrimination is wrong, and that the church owes it to victims of
discrimination (and to God) to make them whole. Or it might provide
meaningful alternative remedies due to a fear on the part of the church
leadership that a failure to take such claims seriously would lead to dissent
and a loss of confidence in the leadership. In either case, the point is clear:
the ministerial exception is not the same thing as indifference to the goals of
civil rights laws, nor does it mean that particular churches would inevitably
insist on total immunity. Reasons of deep religious conscience, as well as
practical concerns about the reaction of members, might lead a church to
give claimants substantial rights, even in the absence of any judicial
process.50
49
See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072–73 (2008)
(defining deference as “a decisionmaker following a determination made by some other individual or
institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently”).
50
It should also be noted that even after Hosanna-Tabor, not all disputes involving ministers would
necessarily lie outside the jurisdiction of the courts. As the church noted in its reply brief in HosannaTabor:
When a church signs a contract written in secular language, the contract can be enforced unless the
basic dispute is entangled in religious questions. So, for example, a contract claim challenging
discharge for cause generally cannot proceed, but a contract claim for unpaid salary or benefits
generally can. Such secular contract claims have always co-existed with the ministerial exception.
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Another question is how the church should treat the claimants in such
cases. The fact that the judicial process would be unavailable does not mean
churches would lack any interest, religious or otherwise, in providing due
process to claimants. Indeed, some churches provide strong procedural
protections for ministers dismissed under these circumstances—protections
that predate the judicial recognition of the ministerial exception.51 Consider
the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, whose conduct is at issue in
Hosanna-Tabor. Although the church considers itself the sole arbiter of
employment disputes involving its ministers,52 its dispute resolution
procedures are no charade. They include a basic trial process, limited
discovery, the right to counsel, and an appeal process; they also establish
neutral tribunals whose members are maintained by the Synod itself, not the
local congregation.53 Its substantive standards are also real: indeed, the
Synod’s laws might ultimately have vindicated Perich’s complaint.54 As one
group of experts on religious tribunals observed in an amicus brief in
Hosanna-Tabor, although “[r]eligious court systems can be quite varied,”
many “share certain primary characteristics, including discernible
substantive standards and procedural rights,” as well as “a stated
commitment to evenhandedness” and an effort to “ensure that the religious

Reply Brief, supra note 42, at 9. The Court acknowledged this point, without clearly deciding it, in
Hosanna-Tabor. See 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types
of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers.”). This is consistent with a proper reading of the Court’s earlier decision in Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979), which held that state courts in cases involving church property disputes may
adopt a “neutral principles” approach, under which such disputes are resolved through a standard legal
interpretation of the secular aspects of deeds, church charters, and other relevant legal documents. The
Court wrote that this approach “shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general—flexibility
in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.” Id. at 603. Similarly, by
allowing churches to draft employment contracts with ministers that are at least partly enforceable in
court despite the existence of the ministerial exception, the law allows churches to voluntarily limit the
scope of their autonomy, leaving room for some legally enforceable employment claims by ministers
where, for various reasons, churches wish to expose aspects of their relationships with ministers to the
jurisdiction of the civil courts.
51
See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
(“COLPA”) Filed on Behalf of the Orthodox Jewish Organizations and Rabbinical Courts in Support of
Petitioner at 7–8, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470841, at *7–8 (discussing
the history of rabbinic courts) [hereinafter COLPA Brief].
52
See HANDBOOK OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH: MISSOURI SYNOD § 1.10.2 (2004), available at
www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=926.
53
See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 101, 142–43
(2011); see also Steven R. Hadley, Handbook of American Church Courts, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 251,
263 (2000) (citing the Seventh-Day Adventists as one example of a church whose dispute resolution
procedures call for “neutral, impartial, and independent” adjudicators).
54
See Lund, supra note 53, at 143 (noting that “the Synod’s church courts would only approve of
Perich’s call being terminated in rare and specifically delineated circumstances”).

985

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

organization is not unfairly favored in the crafting and execution of the
process.”55
In short, it would be wrong to end one’s inquiry at Act II and assume
that the ministerial exception leaves claimants with no recourse whatsoever.
Unsurprisingly, given the long history of church jurisdiction over internal
religious matters, churches themselves regularly provide meaningful
procedural and substantive justice in disputes with their members or
leaders.56
Three additional issues need to be considered in our examination of
Act III of the ministerial exception. First, some churches believe as a matter
of religious doctrine that churches themselves ought to decide disputes with
their ministers, even when those churches share the basic goals of the civil
rights laws.57 They believe that disputes within the church should be
resolved informally and not antagonistically, that internal dispute resolution
is part of the shepherding function of the church and should be undertaken
with compassion and care, that litigating such cases in the civil courts is a
public scandal or causes irreparable harm to the relationship between
church and minister, and so on.58 For such churches, this will be an
important consideration in deciding how to treat disputes with their
ministers, although it does not preclude, but if anything recommends, a
conciliatory rather than an adversarial approach to such disputes.
Second, and relatedly, some churches hold complex views about the
effect of an internal dispute on the relationship between the minister and the
church. From a secular perspective, we may view the assertion of one’s
legal rights as a common, even laudable, phenomenon. From a communal
and religious perspective, however, such conduct may violate both church

55
Brief of Religious Tribunal Experts Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 2470843, at *6–7 [hereinafter Religious Tribunal
Experts’ Brief].
56
See, e.g., COLPA Brief, supra note 51, at 10 (citing a judgment in an employment dispute
decided by a Beth Din, or rabbinic court, that “substantially exceeded any judgment the employee could
have obtained in a New York State court”); Religious Tribunal Experts’ Brief, supra note 55, at 8
(noting that the Judicial Council of the United Methodist Church “has issued over 1,100 decisions
addressing diverse ecclesiastical issues within the UMC, including ministerial employment matters”
(footnote omitted)); id. at 8 n.9 (citing a decision of that tribunal in which it ordered the reinstatement of
a clergy member, along with the payment of “retroactive benefits and compensation,” after finding a
violation of due process in the prior proceeding); id. at 19 n.55 (citing cases in which beth din courts
found in favor of rabbi in employment disputes with synagogues); see generally Hadley, supra note 53
(discussing cases).
57
See, e.g., Lund, supra note 53, at 141–42 (“Even when churches agree with the principles behind
our non-discrimination laws, they [may] still have understandable reasons to object to the government
investigating, adjudicating, and remedying what the government decides are discriminatory acts. There
is all the difference in the world between a church pursuing its own values and the state enforcing those
values back on the church.”).
58
These and other arguments can be found in Hadley, supra note 53.
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doctrines favoring the internal resolution of disputes and the spirit of
community and peacefulness that guides the church.59
Third, even if a church takes neither of these positions, and even if it
strongly opposes discrimination, it may have a different view of what
constitutes “discrimination.”60 It is surely unsurprising that churches may
champion the view that all are equal in God’s eye but take a different view
than the law does about what constitutes equal status—concluding, for
example, that women are equally beloved by God but occupy a role in the
church that does not involve the call to ministry.
Churches need not hold any of these views, but they may hold some or
all of them. That matters for both Act II and Act III reasons. First, it helps
confirm that the Court was right to hold that the ministerial exception
applies to retaliation suits. Unlike a decision to fire an employee on
religious grounds, the argument goes, a church’s decision to fire an
employee in retaliation for the exercise of her legal rights does not involve
entanglement with religious doctrine; the court can accept that the church
had religious reasons for retaliation but still conclude that churches are not
exempt from antiretaliation laws.61 As we have seen, however, churches
hold complex views with respect to the nature of their relationship with
ministers, and with the civil courts. A plaintiff’s decision to bring a
retaliation action in a civil court, and not a religious one, can thus raise
theological questions of a high order. My own view is that the ministerial
exception has more to do with the limits of state power than with questions
of entanglement as such. Regardless, there is little doubt that the Court was
right to worry that allowing retaliation suits to proceed would raise serious
concerns from the perspectives of both state entanglement and religious
autonomy.62
These issues are especially relevant within the Act III realm. There is a
rich diversity of potential responses by churches to claims of discrimination
on the part of a ministerial employee. In concrete terms, they can offer
anything from no process at all, to an informal and communal process, to a
detailed trial process with substantial guarantees of fairness and
59
See, e.g., Brief for International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. at 22–
23, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470840, at *22–23 (“In essence, the
Church concluded that Perich’s conduct [pressing her claims through the threat of litigation] impeded,
and that she was not sufficiently committed to, the Church’s religious mission.”).
60
See Lund, supra note 53, at 145 (“[M]ost churches see themselves as fully committed to racial
justice, to gender equality, to treating the disabled with dignity, and to protecting the elderly. But there is
no reason to think that the church’s conception of any of these things will match the state’s
conception.”). Churches can also take a view of “discrimination” that is broader than its legal definition.
See id. at 146 (noting that some churches’ aggressive efforts to increase the number of women in the
ministry could violate current antidiscrimination law).
61
See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 37, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553),
2011 WL 3319555, at *37.
62
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709; id. at 715–16 (Alito, J., concurring).
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impartiality. Just as important, though, are the less concrete considerations.
Churches can treat discrimination complaints as disruptions or even insults
to the church and its members. Or they can take the view that the church has
a religious duty to avoid discrimination, one that is every bit as central to
the church as any other religious tenet. They can treat these complaints as
isolated incidents, or as matters that demand a broad institutional response.
They can react with defensiveness or hostility, or they can seek outreach,
reconciliation, and genuine closure. They can view the complainant as an
adversary and close ranks, or they can try to approach that individual with
compassion, caring, and a sense of community.
In sum, even if the ministerial exception continues to exist, a court’s
dismissal of a case on those grounds will not signal the end of the church’s
responsibility, but rather the beginning. Churches will still have many
decisions to make. Each one will reflect the church’s deepest beliefs, its
highest goals, and, sometimes, its worst failings. Indeed, most of the
important questions about the ministerial exception will not arise anywhere
near the precincts of the courthouse.
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND THE DUTY OF LAY AND
PUBLIC DISCUSSION
So far, I have argued that church leaders have a continuing obligation
to think carefully about the proper occasions for the ministerial exception
and about how to treat ministers’ complaints. That obligation carries a
strong moral component. The church must consider its own religious duties,
including the obligation to treat complainants with love and compassion; it
must consider its obligations as an institution functioning at least partly in
the secular world.
But the ministerial exception, like most allocations of power, does not
create duties only for those who exercise it directly. As a reflection of the
church’s role as a major infrastructural institution within society,63 the
ministerial exception and its proper use should concern all of us.
Monitoring its use, and sometimes criticizing it, is a civic duty as well as a
religious one.
There is room here for both internal criticism and external public
criticism.64 Even within rigidly hierarchical institutions, there is a great deal
of room for internal discussion, dissent, and reform. All institutions have
many constituencies, any one of which can influence the institution’s
beliefs and actions. Even where a church’s doctrine is set solely by its

63

See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 224); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches
Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274
(2008); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 38, at 39–40.
64
For discussions applying this point to a variety of “First Amendment institutions,” see H ORWITZ,
supra note 11.
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leaders, those leaders must still consider the potential effects of their actions
on their members and the risk that those members will abandon the church.
The leadership may conclude that some doctrine is so important that it must
be preserved even at the cost of losing members, but it will certainly be
aware of that potential cost. In less hierarchical religious institutions, it is
even clearer that a church’s treatment of its ministers is a communal matter
that involves the whole church.
These kinds of questions involve both specific religious norms and
general civic norms. In each dispute with a ministerial employee, the church
and its members will have to consider not only what their religious tenets
demand, but whether they have any general moral obligations to that
employee and any general civic obligations to respect the social norms of
nondiscrimination and conformity to the law.
These questions can and should also be aired outside the church itself.
Citizens are not only permitted, but positively obliged, to monitor and
criticize our central social institutions, whether they belong to them or not.
They are responsible for the civic order as a whole, including the
institutions that form the bedrock of that civic order.
This duty is obvious when we are talking about the state, but it is just
as true for private infrastructural institutions. Whether The New York Times
publishes the Pentagon Papers or shares materials from the WikiLeaks
archives is a decision to be made in the first instance by that newspaper,
operating in accordance with professional and institutional norms, and not
the state.65 But that paper’s readers, and citizens more generally, have the
duty to speak out if they believe that publication would threaten national
security—or, conversely, to urge journalists to be even more aggressive in
publishing information about important government actions that have been
kept secret. University professors make their own decisions about what to
teach and what research to conduct, and those decisions are insulated from
public interference. This autonomy rests on several justifications, one being
that academic freedom serves the public interest.66 But that autonomy does
not prohibit the public from monitoring and criticizing what universities do;
to the contrary, it is a civic duty to do so, even—or perhaps especially—
when the final authority rests with the institution itself.

65

See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (reversing an injunction
preventing the New York Times from publishing classified material); see also Reply Brief, supra note
42, at 26 (noting several areas of the law, all of them involving public or private institutions such as the
press, in which “[legal] claims or remedies are barred because the resulting litigation would be too
problematic or too threatening to other constitutional values”).
66
See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 44 (2009) (“Academic freedom is the price the public must pay in
return for the social good of advancing knowledge.”); LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:
REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 130 (2010).
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These principles also apply to churches. If one believes that churches
are a fundamental part of our social infrastructure, and that this requires
some degree of church autonomy and some limits on state authority, then
surely one must believe that churches’ decisions are as subject to public
commendation or criticism as the actions of any other major social
institution. Churches may not be answerable in a legal sense for actions that
lie at the heart of their institutional role any more than newspapers are
legally accountable to the public for decisions whether to publish a story.67
But they are not immune from public criticism, and they are not indifferent
to it either. Like any other institution, they are susceptible to moral suasion,
reasoned argument, positive and negative reinforcement, and public
pressure. Citizens who care about our central social institutions can and
should provide exactly those sorts of pressures.
All this is worth emphasizing because I have no interest in painting a
rosy picture of the church or any other central social institution. Church
independence, like freedom of the press, academic autonomy, and other
institutionally-oriented constitutional freedoms, is grounded in a variety of
ideas: that the state is limited in its authority, that our social infrastructure
encompasses a variety of nonstate institutions with their own spheres of
authority, that our constitutional settlement assumes these divisions of
authority, that courts are relatively incompetent to second-guess these
institutions’ core decisions, and others.68 To subscribe to this structural view
of the importance of both state and nonstate institutions in our social and
constitutional firmament, one need not believe that churches and other
institutions are perfect or that they will never abuse their autonomy.
Churches most certainly are not perfect, and they will sometimes abuse
their autonomy. It is unfortunate, but unsurprising, that the briefs in support
of the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor said so much about church abuse of
authority and the briefs in support of the church said so little about it. It is
equally unsurprising that the opinions in Hosanna-Tabor say virtually
nothing about this point.69 Churches surely will fire ministers for good
reasons, bad reasons, and sometimes for no reason at all.

67

There are limits, of course, in both cases. Newspapers can be held accountable for libelous
statements, and churches can be liable for injuries to members or third parties, whether they involve
clergy sexual abuse or a church-owned van, driven by a minister, accidentally running over an old lady
in the street. See Reply Brief, supra note 42, at 20. To my mind, this is one way, although still an
imperfect one, to understand the Court’s effort in Hosanna-Tabor to distinguish between regulable
“outward physical acts” and legally autonomous “internal church decision[s].” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.
Ct. at 707. But these peripheral limits do not say much about institutional autonomy in core cases, like
the hiring or firing of ministers.
68
These and other justifications are canvassed, and sometimes criticized, in my forthcoming book.
See HORWITZ, supra note 11.
69
Professor Esbeck writes: “To the fear that the state is in danger from religion, Justice Alito
suggests that another way to look at the matter is to ask, ‘Who watches the watch dog?’” Esbeck, supra
note 15, at 174 n.67 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring)). He quotes
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Supporters of the ministerial exception, and church autonomy more
broadly, must avoid idealizing churches. They must acknowledge that all
legal autonomy, even of a limited sort, carries risks of abuse. If we are right
about the deep nature of the constitutional settlement between church and
state, about the valuable role played by independent churches in our
constitutional and social infrastructure, and about the relative lack of
judicial and legislative competence and authority when it comes to core
church functions such as the selection of ministers, then the risk of abuse
should not shake us from our position. But a candid recognition of these
concerns may lead to a richer and more realistic conversation. It may lead
us to think more clearly about the role of internal and external monitoring
by church authorities, the laity, and citizens at large in encouraging
churches to wield their power prayerfully, compassionately, and
responsibly.
Conversely, an acknowledgment of the potential role played by
internal and external discussion and criticism of churches may encourage
the critics of the ministerial exception to ease up on their alarmist rhetoric.
Some of the briefs in Hosanna-Tabor were crammed with language
suggesting that churches are barely leashed monsters, waiting for a chance
to run amok. They described churches as espousing “a capacious theory of
unaccountability,”70 warned of a “lawless zone [of] defiance”71 that would
have “devastating” consequences, and urged the Court to reject any grant of
“a special privilege to religious employers . . . that makes them a power
unto themselves, separate and apart from the democratic will of the
community.”72 That is impoverished Act II thinking. It ignores the
possibility that church employment decisions will be made in good faith,
and it assumes quite wrongly that the only effective check against abuse is a
legal one. Public pressure and institutional reconsideration, not judicial
relief, led the Los Angeles Police Department to abandon its chokehold
policy and convinced the United States to stop bombing Cambodia.
Justice Alito’s reminder, “[I]t is easy to forget that the autonomy of religious groups, both here in the
United States and abroad, has often served as a shield against oppressive civil laws.” Id. (quoting
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). This is not much of an
admission that churches can act badly as well as decently. It hardly acknowledges that churches
sometimes will exercise their power over ministerial employees arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and for
reasons having nothing to do with faith or mission, or that, as the concurrence admits, “the goal of the
civil law in question, the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities,” is not
“oppressive” but “worthy.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring).
70
Brief of Bishopaccountability.org et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23,
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532696, at *23.
71
Professors’ Brief, supra note 30, at 2.
72
Brief of Amicus Curiae Neil H. Cogan in Support of Respondents Urging Affirmance at 4,
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532697, at *4. I am not sure why it is more
ominous to think of churches, an important mediating institution, as being “separate and apart from the
democratic will of the community” than it is to think of them as abject servants of the popular will,
subject to majority rule even with respect to core operations such as the selection of ministers.
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In short, consequentialist arguments against the ministerial exception,
and broad arguments in favor of the exception, will both be incomplete and
inaccurate unless they acknowledge the role of internal discussion and
public criticism in shaping the institutional norms, policies, and actions of
churches.73 We cannot properly assess the costs and benefits of the
ministerial exception or church autonomy—or indeed any other form of
institutional autonomy—until we break out of a false dichotomy in which
one side is blind to anything except state power and the other side treats the
church, the press, and other institutions as paragons of virtue. The former
approach pays too little attention to vast stretches of our constitutional
structure and culture and ignores the vital and often underexamined role of
“communities and movements” within our broader system of
constitutionalism.74 The latter approach will leave many difficult questions
unaddressed and will lack a full sense of moral accountability and integrity
unless it acknowledges the costs of institutionalism. We must talk candidly
about potential abuses of the ministerial exception. But we must do so in a
way that accounts for all the ways of addressing those abuses, including
internal and public discussion within and about churches, not just state
coercion.
CONCLUSION
To be clear, I think the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor was entirely
right to affirm the ministerial exception and to treat it as a necessary
implication of both the historical church–state settlement and the basic
principles of the Religion Clauses. More than that, I believe the ministerial
exception stands in for broader constitutional and political principles: that
state power is vital but limited, that our social and constitutional
infrastructure contains not just a single monolithic authority but a number
of key independent institutions, and that pluralism, public discourse, and
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It should be clear, moreover, that many of the arguments against the ministerial exception are
consequentialist, and that the implications of those arguments are very broad indeed. Beyond the
ministerial exception itself, they also call into question the constitutionality of existing statutory
exceptions from the employment discrimination laws for religious employers. See, e.g., Leslie C.
Griffin, No Law Respecting the Practice of Religion, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 475, 492 (2008)
(arguing that the leading decision upholding Title VII’s exemption for religious employers who
discriminate on the basis of religion, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), was wrong to the extent that it allowed a church to
select a nonministerial employee on the basis of religion). These kinds of consequentialist arguments
will be deeply flawed unless they account for nonlegal methods of restraint as well as legal ones.
74
See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983); id. at 4
(“The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social
order are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the normative universe
that ought to claim our attention.”).
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freedom are best served by appreciating the extent to which these
institutions are and should be self-governing.75
But recognizing the power that churches and other central institutions
possess is just the beginning of the conversation. Just as important as the
scope of that power is the question of what should be done with it. We
impoverish ourselves by talking only in Act II terms—by acting as if every
important question is settled once we know whether the state or the church
has the whip hand. We fail to appreciate the richness of institutional life in a
pluralistic society and the duty of both citizens and institutions to
participate in that society after the court has spoken. Institutional autonomy
is real, but it is a burden as well as a freedom. To have a “free church in a
free state,” we need reflective churches and active citizens. Now that the
curtain has come down on the legal issues of power raised by HosannaTabor, we must begin to think about our own parts in the drama, as
churches and citizens, once the curtain comes up on Act III.

75

See HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 16–20).
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